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THE CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN
MARYLAND
AFTER
UPJOHN AND
THE
RECENT
DO
THE
CORPORATE
SCANDALS:
WHERE
MARYLAND COURTS GO FROM HERE?
I.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CORPORATE ATTORNEYCLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE MULTIPLE TESTS

The attorney-client privilege serves to protect and promote
communications between clients and lawyers. According to the
Supreme Court in Upjohn Co. v. United States, I the purpose of the
attorney-client privilege "is to encourage full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby
promote broader public interests in the observance of law and
administration of justice.,,2
This privilege only covers
"communications between lawyer and client in which the client is
seeking legal advice or other legal services.,,3
For a communication to be covered under the attorney-client
privilege, the following five factors must be present: "(1) a client, (2)
a lawyer, (3) a retainer for the purpose of rendering legal advice, (4) a
communication between them and (5) an intent that the
communication be confidential. ,-;4 This privilege is available to both
individual and corporate clients. s
Prior to the decision in Upjohn, there were two primary tests used
by the federal courts, as well as the courts of individual states, to
determine if a communication in the corporate setting was covered
under the corporate attorney-client privilege. 6 The first test, the
control group test, "limits the privilege to communications from
1.

2.
3.
4.

5.

6.

449 U.S. 383 (1981).
Id. at 389.
LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW
166 (2005).
Dennis J. Black & Nancy E. Barton, Implications of the Attorney-Client Privilege
and Work-Product Doctrine, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS 17, 22-23
(Brad D. Brian & Barry F. McNeil eds., 2d ed. 2003).
LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 3, at 176.
See Michael L. Waldman, Beyond Upjohn: The Attorney-Client Privilege in the
Corporate Context, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 473,474 (1987) (stating that the "two
major tests" which emerged in the 1960s and the 1970s were the control group test
and the subject matter test); see also Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 386 (stating that "two
'tests' [had] gained adherents in the courts of appeals").
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persons in the organization who have authority to mold
organizational policy or to take action in accordance with the
lawyer's advice.,,7 The second test, the subject matter test, "extends
the privilege to communications with any [management or] lowerechelon employee or agent so long as the communication relates to
the subject matter of the representation."s
Before l{fjohn, the control group test was thought to be the test of
the future. In the Upjohn case, however, the Supreme Court held
that the subject matter test was more a~propriate, and therefore, it
should be followed by all federal courts. I Where the Supreme Court
failed in its Upjohn decision was its choice not to specifically layout
the factors that should be used to detennine if a communication is
covered under the chosen subject matter test. I I
As the Supreme Court's Upjohn decision was a federal decision, it
is not binding authority on the individual states. 12 As such, some
states have chosen to follow the Supreme Court's lead and apply the
subject matter approach, while others have decided to continue with
their application of the control group test. 13 The Court of Appeals of
Maryland, however, has specifically declined to choose a test until
the court detennines it is necessary to do so; 14 therefore, an analysis
of the two tests, the control group and the subject matter tests, will
likely be perfonned by the Maryland courts in the future.
This Comment will discuss the rationale behind the Court's
adoption of the subject matter test, while comparing this decision
with that of some states to continue adhering to the control group test
and that of yet other states adofting a version of the subject matter
test that differs from Upjohn. I These different approaches are all
options the Maryland courts will need to analyze when faced with
choosing which test should be applied to detennine whether or not a
given communication is protected under the corporate attorney-client
privilege.
7.
8.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

15.

LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 3, at 180 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73 cmt. d (2000».
ld. (alteration in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 73 cmt. d (footnotes omitted».
JOHN WILLIAM GERGACZ, ATTORNEy-CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE 3-133 (3d ed.
2001).
LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 3, at 176; Upjohn, 449 U.S. 383.
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 386.
GERGACZ, supra note 9, at 3-170.
LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 3, at 180.
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Forma-Pack, Inc., 351 Md. 396, 421, 718 A.2d
1129, 1141 (1998).
See infra Parts III, IV, V.
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Further considerations have also arisen as a result of the corporate
scandals of the past ten years. The consequences of the recent
scandals have forced corporations to waive the attorney-client
privilege and provide as much information as possible to government
prosecutors in order for a corporation to be deemed cooperative in an
investigation of an alleged wrongdoing. 16 As such, employees are
often left unprotected as corporations simply tum over their
statements to prosecutors, leading to self-incrimination and other
constitutional issues. 17 Therefore, the Maryland courts should also
consider these recent events in determining which test should be
applied to ensure a corporation's employees are adequately protected.
This Comment will also consider Maryland's policies in regards to
promoting a broad level of discovery and how these policies point
towards the adoption of the control group test. 18 Additionally, the
adoption of the control group test by Maryland courts will likely
promote a narrowing of the corporate attorney-client privilege in
Maryland which is preferable as corporations are unlikely to
anticipate in which venue they will ultimately face litigation;
therefore, this will protect Maryland corporations from using the
broader subject matter test and then ultimately facin¥. litigation in a
venue that applies the more narrow control group test. 9
The Comment will begin with a discussion of the history of the
attorney-client privilege prior to Upjohn, which defined the two
current tests. 20 Next, this Comment will provide an overview of the
Supreme Court's Upjohn decision that limited the federal courts to
use of the subject matter test. 21 The current status and continuing
application of the control group test by various states will also be
discussed,22 as will the modifications made to the subject matter test
by other state COurtS. 23 The effect that current events, such as the
government's request for waivers of the attorne~-client privilege and
the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 4 will have on the
attorney-client privilege and how these changes could lead to the
renewal of the control group test will also be explored. 25 The
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See infra Part VI.A.
See infra Part VI.A.
See infra Part VIII.B.
See infra Parts VII, X.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
See infra Part VI.
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removal of the attorney-client privilege altogether has been debated
in the past, and therefore, this option will also be considered?6
Lastly this Comment will discuss the history of the attorney-client
privilege in Maryland, along with public policies of the Maryland
courts that support those policies best advanced by the control group
test;27 therefore, the Court of Appeals of Maryland should adopt the
control group test if faced with a choice between these two tests in
the future. 28
Overall, federal law related to the corporate attorney-client
privilege is flawed due to the government's current demands for
waivers of the corporate attorney-client privilege. The subject matter
test also provides too much protection of corporate senior
management and too strictly restrains discovery;29 therefore, the
Maryland courts should adopt the control group test when inevitably
faced with this decision in the future.
II.

THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE PRIOR TO UPJOHN

Although the current status of the corporate attorney-client
privilege in the United States is a result of the Supreme Court's
Upjohn decision, a brief review of the history of the privilege and the
decisions that came before this landmark case are important to help
gain an understanding of how the two tests have evolved. Before the
Supreme Court decided the Upjohn case, it was generalld' believed
that the control group test would be the test of the future? This test
was first applied in Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp./i
when Judge Kirkpatrick indicated:
[I]f the employee making the communication, of whatever
rank he may be, is in a position to control or even to take a
substantial part in a decision about any action which the
corporation may take upon the advice of the attorney, or if
he is an authorized member of a body or group which has
that authority, then, in effect, he is (or personifies) the
corporation when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer and
the privilege would apply.32

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See infra Part VII.
See infra Part VIII.
See infra Parts VIII, IX.
See infra Part IX.
GERGACZ, supra note 9, at 3-133.
210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
1d. at 485.
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As such, members of the control group were not viewed based
upon their place in the organization, but instead upon their authority
to playa role in its decision making and to authorize the actions that
the corporation would ultimately take based upon the
recommendations of the attorney; therefore, the control group could
consist of chief executives of a corporation as well as lower level
managers with authority to assist in the decision-making process. 33 If
the corporate employee communicating with the employer was within
the control group, then the communication was considered to be
covered under the attorney-client privilege?4'
After the introduction of the control group test by the Philadelphia
court, there were mixed reviews of the strengths and weaknesses of
the test. The primary advantages of the test were considered to be the
narrowness of its scope and the predictability of its application. 35
The primary complaints regarding the control group test were that it
was too limiting of the flow of information between corporate
attorneys and employees, that it only protected upper level employees
of the corporate client, and that it tried too hard to turn the corporate
client into an individual client. 36
The subject matter test was also in existence prior to the Upjohn
decision. The first subject matter test was applied by the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Decker. 37 The subject matter test outlined by the Harper court is as
follows:
[A]n employee of a corporation, though not a member of its
control group, is sufficiently identified with the corporation
so that his communication to the corporation's attorney is
privileged where the employee makes the communication at
the direction of his superiors in the corporation and where
the subject matter upon which the attorney's advice is
sought by the corporation and dealt with in the
communication is the performance by the employee of the
duties of his employment. 38
This test was introduced as a way around the weaknesses of the
control group test. The subject matter test broadened the scope of
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

GERGACZ, supra note 9, at 3-133 to -134.
Id. at 3-133.
Id. at 3-134 to -135.
Id. at 3-135 to -136.
423 F.2d 487,491-92 (7th Cir. 1970).
Jd.
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employees who were to be covered by the privilege, acknowledging
that employees outside of those considered to be within the control
group may have information needed by an attorney.39 Although this
test took into account this weakness of the control groW' test, other
courts refused to adopt it due to its "overbreadth.''''
As such,
multiple versions of the subject matter test came into existence prior
to the Upjohn decision in 1981 in attempt to keep the corporate
attorney-client privilege from becoming overly broad.'I1
III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE UPJOHN V. UNITED STATES
DECISION
After the development of the control group and subject matter tests,
each federal court independently chose which test to apply, resulting
in many different applications of the tests among federal circuits;
therefore, the Supreme Court finally addressed this split of authority
in the Upjohn decision. 42 In Upjohn, the Supreme Court recognized
this lack of consensus amongst the federal circuits, as both the control
group and subject matter tests were being followed, often in different
forms. 43 As such, the Supreme Court, through its decision in Ujpohn,
undertook to limit the federal circuits to the subject matter test.
In order for the Upjohn decision to be clearly understood, a brief
overview of the facts of this case is necessary. In the Upjohn case,
corporate counsel for Upjohn was notified that a foreign subsidiary
had been making "questionable payments to fore~n government
officials in order to secure government business."
An internal
investigation of the payments was performed and questionnaires were
sent to all foreign Upjohn managers requesting information regarding

39.
40.
41.

42.
43.
44.
45.

GERGACZ, supra note 9, at 3-137.
Id. at 3-137 to -138.
See, e.g., Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane)
(applying an alternate version of the Harper & Row subject matter test, under which
"the attorney-client privilege is applicable to an employee's communication if (1) the
communication was made for the purpose of securing legal advice; (2) the employee
making the communication did so at the direction of his corporate superior; (3) the
superior made the request so that the corporation could secure legal advice; (4) the
subject matter of the communication is within the scope of the employee's corporate
duties; and (5) the communication is not disseminated beyond those persons who,
because of the corporate structure, need to know its contents."); Duplan Corp. v.
Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1975) (applying both the control
group test as well as the Harper & Row subject matter test).
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,386 (1981).
See id.
See id. at 390--97.
Id. at 383.
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the alleged payments. 46 Those who received the questionnaires, as
well as officers and other employees, were then interviewed by legal
Corporate counsel voluntarily notified the Internal
counsel. 47
Revenue Service (IRS), and the IRS began their own investigation. 48
The IRS demanded copies of the questionnaires and notes from the
interviews, but corporate counsel refused to provide them as they
believed the re~uested materials were covered under the attorneyclient privilege. 4 The Upjohn case ensued.
First, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
applied the control group test. 50 The Sixth Circuit indicated their
concerns with the subject matter test, primarily indicating that the test
encourages senior managers to "ignore important infonnation they
have good business reasons to know and use.,,51 Additionally, the
Sixth Circuit was concerned that the subject matter test was
overbroad. 52 The court discussed their concerns with the subject
matter test in detail, warning that it encourages corporate
management to infonn corporate counsel only generally as to a given
issue; therefore, corporate counsel must then discuss the transactions
with subordinate employees at the direction of management, putting
the full details of a given issue in the hands of corporate attorneys,
and thereby protecting it under the attorney-client privilege. 53 The
fear of the Sixth Circuit was that the subject matter test could
severely limit discovery, especially in this case where the subordinate
employees were located in foreign countries, causing the infonnation
to be extremely burdensome to discover. 54 As such, the Sixth Circuit
declined application of the subject matter test in favor of the more
narrow control group test. 55
However, the Supreme Court reviewed the case and overturned the
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, refusing to
appl~ the control group test in favor of the broader subject matter
test. 6 In its decision the Supreme Court detailed its rationale behind
the privilege and how the subject matter test best supports this
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223,1226-27 (6th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 1227.
Id.
Id.
Id.
/d.

See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391-92, 395-97 (1981).
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rationale. 57 According to the Court, "the privilege exists to protect
not only the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it
but also the giving of infonnation to the lawyer to enable him to give
sound and infonned advice.,,58 The Court also cited the ABA Code
of Professional Responsibility, Ethical Consideration 4-1 indicating
that:
A lawyer should be fully infonned of all the facts of the
matter he is handling in order for his client to obtain the full
advantage of our legal system. It is for the lawyer in the
exercise of his independent professional judgment to
separate the relevant and important from the irrelevant and
unimportant. The observance of the ethical obligation of a
lawyer to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his
client not only facilitates the full development of facts
essential to proper representation of the client but also
encourages laymen to seek early legal assistance. 59
As the attorney-client privilege applies to corporations, the Court
recognized that employees outside of the traditional "control group"
will often be the employees who hold infonnation needed by
corporate legal counse1. 60 Not only management level employees,
but also middle and lower level employees, may actually create legal
issues for corporations. 61 As such, corporate lawyers often need to
obtain infonnation from those employees outside of the traditional
control group to ade'1uately advise the corporation regarding a legal
issue being reviewed. 2
In Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith,63 this problem was
acknowledged. 64 Where a corporate legal issue involves a complex
problem, corporate attorneys are faced with a difficult choice under
the control group test: They can either interview lower level
employees who may have the necessary infonnation knowing these
communications will not be privileged, or they can interview those
high level employees covered by the control group test knowing it
will be difficult, if at all possible, to obtain the needed infonnation. 65
57.

Id. at 390.

58.

ld.

59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 391 (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1980».
Id.
Id.
Id.

63.

572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978).

64.
65.

Id. at 608-09.
Id. (citing Alan J. Weinschel, Corporate Employee Interviews and the AttorneyClient Privilege, 12 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 872, 876 (1971».
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Additionally, the Upjohn Court recognized that employees outside
of the control group are often the employees more likely to be in need
of legal advice from corporate counsel than those who are of higher
authority.66 The Court indicated that the control group test "makes it
difficult for corporate attorneys to formulate sound advice when their
client is faced with a specific legal problem but also threatens to limit
the valuable efforts of corporate counsel to ensure their client's
compliance with the law.,,67 The Court noted the importance of being
able to predict whether a communication will be protected under the
privilege, which it believed would be better accomplished by the
application of the subject matter test. 68
Although the majority opinion in Upjohn held that the subject
matter test should be applied moving forward, the Supreme Court
declined "to lay down a broad rule.,,69 Justice Burger, in his
concurring opinion, expressed his concerns with the majority's
decision not to define a broad rule and opined that a standard should
have been provided by the Court. 70 Therefore, Justice Burger
formulated the following standard:
[A] communication is privileged at least when . . . an
employee or former employee speaks at the direction of the
management with an attorney regarding conduct or
proposed conduct within the scope of employment. The
attorney must be one authorized by the management to
inquire into the subject and must be seeking information to
assist counsel in performing any of the following functions:
(a) evaluating whether the employee's conduct has bound or
would bind the corporation; (b) assessing the legal
consequences, if any, of that conduct; or (c) formulating
appropriate legal responses to actions that have been or may
be taken by others with regard to that conduct. 7!
Others have also attempted to detail the factors that the Upjohn
Court intended to promote. For example, John William Gergacz
outlined two groups of factors. 72 The first group of factors are
"common to all claims of attorney-client privilege" and indicate that
"[t]he communication was made to corporate counsel," "[t]he
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392.
ld.
ld. at 393.
ld. at 386.
ld. at 402 (Burger, J., concurring).
ld. at 403.
GERGACZ, supra note 9, at 3-153 to -154.
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communications were made to secure legal advice from counsel," and
"[t]he confidentiality requirements.,,73 The second group of factors
"limit[s] the scope of corporate communications that would otherwise
be subject to the privilege.,,74 These factors are as follows:
1. The communication was made by a corporate employee.
2. The communication was made upon order of the
employee's superiors. 3. The information needed by
counsel was not available from upper level management. 4.
The information communicated concerned matters within
the scope of the employee's corporate duties. 5. The
employee was aware that the reason for communicating with
counsel was so the corporation could obtain legal advice. 6.
The identity and resources of the opposing party.75
As such, the major concern with the Upjohn decision is its failure
to identify a bright-line application of the subject matter test;
therefore, each federal court may still mold its own version of the
rule for attorney-client privilege as long as it follows under the
subject matter test. An additional concern is that many state courts
have attempted to follow the holding and apply the subject matter
test,76 while others have adopted their own version of the subject
matter tes~ 77 and still others have continued to apply the control
group test. S As a result, numerous tests continue to be applied, and
these tests can vary greatly between jurisdictions. 79
IV. THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE CONTROL GROUP TEST
IN STATE COURTS
Although the Supreme Court adopted the subject matter test, which
is now followed in all federal courts, some state courts have
continued their adherence to the control group test even post-Upjohn.
As of 1997, "fourteen [states had] adopted Upjohn or another subject
matter approach and eight [had] adopted the control group test."so
"Twenty-eight states [had] yet to decide which approach [would]

73.
74.
75.
76.

77.
78.

79.
80.

Jd.
Id. at 3-154.
Id.
Brian E. Hamilton, Conflict, Disparity, and Indecision: The Unsettled Corporate
Attorney-Client Privilege, 3 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 629, 633 (1997).
Id. at 640-44 (explaining that California, Florida, Utah, and Arizona have adopted
variations of the subject matter test).
Id. at 644.
Id. at 633-46 (detailing the tests used in various states as of 1997).
Id. at 633.
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govern, as there [had] been neither a state high court ruling nor a
statute or evidentiary rule adopted on the matter in those states.,,81
Illinois is one example of a state that has continued to adhere to the
control group test, even after Upjohn. In Consolidation Coal
Company v. Bucyrus-Erie Company,82 the Supreme Court of Illinois
held that Illinois would continue to adhere to the control group test
even post-Upjohn. 83 While the Illinois court recognized that the
purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to promote communications
between attorneys and clients, it refused to expand the privilege too
far in corporate cases. 84 The court was concerned that if the privilege
was expanded to include all employees covered under the subject
matter test, that it could serve as "an absolute bar to the discovery of
relevant and material evidentiary facts, and in the corporate context,
given the large number of employees, frequent dealings with la~ers
and masses of documents, the 'zone of silence grows large. ",85 The
court recognized Illinois' policies of "broad discovery" and "the
ultimate ascertainment of the truth" and found the subject matter test
to be incompatible with those state policies. 86
As a result, the court held that the privilege should be limited "to
the extent reasonably necessary to achieve its purpose. ,,87 The
control group test was found to be "a reasonable balance [of]
protecting consultations with counsel by those who are the
decisionmakers or who substantially influence corporate decisions
and by minimizing the. amount of relevant factual material which is
immune from discovery.,,88 The court also noted their belief that the
benefits of the control group test are "its predictability and ease of
application. ,,89
This court also opined as to who would be a member of the control
group.90 According to the opinion, an employee who advises top
management, and whose opinion a decision normally would not be
made without, is a member of the control group.91 If an employee is
8l.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

87.
88.
89.
90.
9l.

ld.
432 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 1982).
Jd. at 257.
ld. at 256-57.
Id. (quoting David Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations,
65 YALE L. 1. 953, 955 (1956».
Jd. at 257.
Id.
Jd.
Id.
ld. at 258.
Id.
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consulted in an effort to determine what action a corporate entity will
take, then their communications are protected as a member of the
control group.92 On the other hand, employees who those individuals
may rely on "for supplying information are not members of the
control group.,,93
Illinois is not the only state that has chosen to continue to apply the
control group test to the corporate attorney-client privilege. In
addition to Illinois, other states have adopted the control group test,
but most states have done so primarily through rules of evidence or
legislation. 94 The states that have adopted the control group test have
adopted a test similar to that recognized by the Illinois Supreme
Court in Consolidated Coal Company.95
States which have adopted rules of evidence applying the control
group test to the attorney-client privilege include: Alaska, Hawaii,
Maine, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and South
Dakota. 96 The rules adopted by these states indicate that "[a]
representative of a client is one having authority to obtain
professional legal services and to act on advice rendered pursuant
thereto on behalf of the client.',97 Additionally, New Hampshire
indicates in their advisory committee notes that it advocates the
control group test as opposed to Upjohn's subject matter test because
it is "consistent with the purpose of the privilege to encourage
communication without unduly inhibiting trial preparation in the
special context of corporate activity.,,98
V. MODIFIED SUBJECT MATTER TESTS IN STATE COURTS
The problem with the Supreme Court's Upjohn decision was its
failure to detail a list of factors that should be used in determining
whether a communication falls within the subject matter test. As a
result, even while some states have chosen to adopt the subject matter
test as discussed above under Upjohn,99 some states have adopted a

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

9S.
99.

ld.
ld.
Hamilton, supra note 76, at 640-41
ld. at 633-39 (quoting the language of statutes from the eight states that have adopted
the control group test).
ld. at 633-40.
See ALASKA CT. R. 503(a)(2); HAw. CT. R. 503(a)(2); ME. R. OF CT. 502(a)(2); N.H.
R. OF CT. 502(a)(2); N.D. CENT. CODE CT. R. 502(a)(2); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
2502(A)(4) (West 1993 & Supp. 200S); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13-2(2) (1995);
see also Hamilton, supra note 76, at 633-39.
N.H. R. Evid. 502(a)(2) advisory committee's notes.
Hamilton, supra note 76, at 633.
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modified approach to this test. IOO The Supreme Court of Arizona, in
Samaritan Foundation v. Good/arb,101 rejected an approach to
attorney-client privilege as it relates to a corporation that turns on the
communicator instead of the communication. 102 The court further
rejected the control group test because there is a distinction between
communications made as an individual and those made as an agent of
the corporation. 103 The control group test was thought to be underinclusive, as the focus is only on the communicator when there may
be additional employees who hold relevant information; while the
subject matter test was viewed as over-inclusive, as the focus is on
the communication, regardless of who makes it, which may lead to
employees who were merel.?' witnesses to such conduct being
included under the privilege. 10
The Good/arb court indicated that a more functional approach
Under this. approach, attorney-client
should be adopted. 105
communication relates only to the employee's own actions that fall
within the scope of their corporate responsibilities. l06 The court
formulated the rule as follows:
[W]here someone other than the employee initiates the
communication, a factual communication by a corporate
employee to corporate counsel is within the corporation's
privilege if it concerns the employee's own conduct within
the scope of his or her employment and is made to assist the
lawyer in assessing or responding to the legal consequences
of that conduct for the corporate client. This excludes from
the privilege communications from those who, but for their
status as officers, agents or employees, are witnesses. 107
Thus, the Arizona court's holding attempts to balance the competing
interests of the straight forward subject matter test and the control
group test which was rejected by the Upjohn COurt. 108
100.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

See, e.g., Samaritan Found. v. Goodfarb, 862 P.2d 870, 874 (Ariz. 1993); S. Bell Tel.
& Tel. Co. v. Deason, 632 So. 2d 1377, 1382-83 (Fla. 1994) (Florida and Arizona
are two states whose courts have adopted modified versions of the subject matter
test).
862 P.2d 870 (Ariz. 1993).
ld. at 874.
ld. at 875.
ld
ld. at 874.
ld. at 878.
ld at 880.
ld.
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Another modified approach to the subject matter test was adopted
in Florida. I09 The Florida Supreme Court showed a concern with the
relationship difference between corporate clients and their legal
counsel and regular individual clients and their attorneys.IIO As
corporate legal counsel has continuing contact with their clients
because they often sit in the same offices, etc., it is possible that the
"zone of silence" as a result of attorney-client communications will
be enlarged. III The court tried to balance the interests of encouraging
employees of corporations to seek legal advice from their corporate
attorneys while ensuring that discovery of relevant information is not
. d.112
compromIse
As a result of the Florida Supreme Court's concerns, it arrived at
the following application of the subject matter test:
[T]he attorney-client privilege applies if: (1) the
communication was made for the purpose of securing legal
advice; (2) the employee making the communication did so
at the direction of his corporate superior; (3) the superior
made the request so that the corporation could secure legal
advice; (4) the subject matter of the communication is
within the scope of the employee's corporate duties, and; (5)
the communication is not disseminated beyond those
persons who, because of the corporate structure, need to
know its contents. I13
The rules of the Arizona and Florida Supreme Courts appear to
reach the same result, while at first glance they seem to have unique
goals. The Arizona court's primary concern was ensuring that what
employees see and hear as witnesses is not protected under the
attorney client privilege as this would be an extension of what is
covered under the attorney client privilege as it relates to individual
clients. 114 The Florida Supreme Court was primarily concerned with
the content of the communication between the client and the attorney
in a corporate environment due to the closeness of their working
relationship. IIS However, upon review of the rules laid out by each
of the courts, the outcome appears to be extremely similar, except
that the Florida rule requires the communication to be made at the
109.

S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Deason, 632 So. 2d 1377, 1382-83 (Fla. 1994).

110.
112.
113.

Id. at 1383.
Id.
Id.
Id.

114.
115.

Samaritan Found. v. Goodfarb, 862 P.2d 870, 878-79 (Ariz. 1993).
S. Bell Co., 632 So. 2d 1377 at 1383.

111.
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direction of an employee's supervisor and the Arizona rule includes a
stipulation that the communication cannot concern information
'
. 116
. d
obtame
as a wItness
to an actIOn.
VI. WAIVER OF THE ATTORNEY -CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Even while there are many tests for the Maryland courts to analyze,
there are additional considerations that the Maryland courts should
consider. One additional consideration in choosing a test is the
government's current push for waivers of the attorney-client
privilege. Although it is primarily federal government agencies
requesting these waivers, it is still necessary for the Maryland courts
to consider these requests in deciding how the attorney-client
privilege rules should be applied to corporations in Maryland.
A.

Government Waivers and How They Affect Corporate Employees

First, one must look at how government waivers came about and
subsequently how these waivers affect the attorney-client privilege.
In recent years, the Department of Justice has adopted guidelines
indicating that a corporation will not be deemed "cooperative" in a
federal government criminal investigation of corporate conduct if it
does not waive the attorney-client privilege and work-product
doctrines. l17 Additionally, the U.S. Sentencing Commission noted
that waivers of the attorney-client privilege will be used to determine
a corporation's "culpability score," which can in tum affect how
corporate players are eventually sentenced. I 18
As a result,
corporations are more likely to waive the attorney-client privilege
today than ever before.
After the Enron scandal l19 and the dismantling of the accounting
giant Arthur Andersen,120 it is understandable that corporations fear

116.
117.

118.
119.

120.

See supra notes 106, 107, 113 and accompanying text.
Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Reconsidering the Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: A
Response to the Compelled-Voluntary Waiver Paradox, 34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 897,
898 (2006).
Id.
Enron's stock, which traded at $85 per share, fell to $0.40 per share after the SEC
began investigations into the company's questionable accounting practices. See
Marianne M. Jennings, A Primer on Enron: Lessons from a Perfect Storm of
Financial Reporting, Corporate Governance and Ethical Culture Failures, 39 CAL.
w. L. REv. 163, 195 (2003).
See James Kelly, The Power of Indictment and the Demise ofArthur Anderson, 48 S.
TEX. L. REv. 509, 515 (2006). Arthur Anderson was the independent auditor for
Enron and was indicted for obstructing justice in regard to its involvement with the
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for the future of their continuing operations and, therefore, are more
likely to cooperate with federal prosecutors. 121 However, prosecutors
are demanding that these corporations turn over information gained
as a result of internal corporate investigations without refard for the
attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrines. 12 In some
instances, corporations are even agreeing to conduct internal
investigations on behalf of, and for the benefit of, these government
.
123
agencIes.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has accomplished
success in obtaining waivers and attempting to crack down on
corporate scandals by passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,124
issuance of the "Seaboard Report" in 2001,125 and the codification of
the "Seaboard Report" in 2006. 126 The goal of the SEC in its
adoption of the above is "easy access to all information, regardless of
relevance, and the 'targeting' by private attorneys of corporate
employees for the government investigators to focus upon."I27
As a result of this increase in pressure by government agencies,
employees of these corporations often face lose-lose situations. First,
if the employee refuses to cooperate in the internal investigation, he
will often face termination from his employment. 128 On the other
hand, if he voluntarily works with corporate counsel, he risks that
"not only will [his] statements be turned over to the government, but
that any false statement or a failure to overtly implicate oneself will,
in itself, lead to charges of 'obstruction of justice' or 'false
statements. ",129 As a result, it appears that a corporation and its

121.
122.
123.
124.

125.

126.

127.
128.
129.

Enron scandal. Id. at 512-13 (indicating that the indictment alone was enough "to
wipe out one of the largest accounting firms in the nation").
Marvin G. Pickholz & Jason R. Pickholz, Investigations Put Employees in Tough
Spot, N.Y.L.J., July 24, 2006, at 10-12.
Id.
Id.
William R. McLucas, Howard M. Shapiro & Julie J. Song, The Decline oj the
Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Setting, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
621,626-27,635 (2006).
Pickholz & Pickholz, supra note 121, at 11. This report made "it clear that early
'cooperation,' often entailing waivers of the attorney-client privilege and attorney
work product privileges ... was expected." Id.
Id.; see also Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, Statement of the
Securities and Exchange Commission Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm.
Pickholz & Pickholz, supra note 121, at 11.
ld. at 11-12.
Id. at 12.
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attorneys investigating a corporate legal issue are "acting under the
'color oflaw' during [their] employee interviews.,,13o
As corporations are often acting in a position similar to that of the
government itself, and the statements made to corporate attorneys
may be indictable by government agencies, employees should be
allowed to invoke their Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights or other
rights provided under state law. 131
As a result, the American Bar Association (ABA) is working in an
attempt to further protect the attorney-client privilege and workproduct doctrine while also working to protect the rights of
corporations' employees. 132 The ABA indicated its concern that if
the corporate attorney-client privilege is allowed to be eroded by the
government, this could lead to its erosion from all criminal and civil
litigation, including where the privilege is protecting individuals
instead of corporations. 133 The ABA released a statement and:
[E]xpressed support of the attorney-client privilege and the
work-product doctrine as being essential to maintaining the
confidential relationship between an attorney and client. It
is the single tool that protects full and candid conversation
about any given case. It aids in establishing advocacy,
promotes civil functioning of the legal system and
guarantees the client full and equal access to justice. 134
The ABA has also shown concern with the current policies being
followed by prosecutors as they have led to a "lack of accountability
in the higher ranks of corporate operations.,,135 As a result, corporate
employees and "those least able to defend themselves end up being
sacrificed to the system.,,136
The ABA "opposes policies, practices and procedures of
governmental bodies that have the effect of [eroding] the attorneyclient privilege and work product doctrine and favors policies,
practices and procedures that recognize the value[] of those

130.
131.
132.

133.
134.
135.
136.

Jd.
Jd.
Mike Nixon, Lawyers Adopt Decree Supporting Attorney-Client Privilege, ST.
DAILY REc., Aug. 19,2006, available at 2006 WLNR 14537069.

Jd.
ld.
Jd.
Jd.
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protections.,,137 The ABA has also "voiced opposition" to the
government seeking waivers of the attorney-client privilege or workproduct doctrine throueh denying or granting benefits during a
corporate investigation. 8 In an attempt to protect employees, the
ABA has been in discussions with federal regulators and is also
seeing more corporate attorneys protecting their clients. 139
B.

How Waivers of the Attorney-Client Privilege Implicate the
Choosing of a Test in Maryland

The problem with the subject matter test is that it protects all
communications between a corporation's attorneys and its employees
as long as the subject matter of the communication is within the
scope of the attorney's legal representation of the corporation. 14o
Therefore:
By narrowing the group of corporate representatives whose
communications would be covered by the privilege to those
who are capable of controlling or binding the entity in some
fashion, the privilege is necessarily focused upon the type of
information that would most be entitled to coverage under
the individual attorney-client privilege. 141
The subject matter test protects communications by employees at any
level, while those with the ability to waive the privilege are those
employees whom would fit within the traditional control group.142
Additionally, waiving the attorney-client privilege as to the
government will unfortunately also waive the attorney-client
privilege as to all other parties, including potential plaintiffs and their
counsel. 143 The communications which are disclosed lose their
"privileged" status; therefore, the communications would also be
non-privileged if litigation is faced in another venue. 144
In the Upjohn decision, the Supreme Court expressed its concerns
with protecting employees, indicating the employees outside of the
control group are often those most in need of legal advice from
137.

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. (quoting ABA Task Force on Attorney-Client Privilege, Recommendation III
(Aug. 2005), available at http://www.abanet.orglbuslaw/attorneyclientlmaterialslhodl
recommendation_adopted. pdt).
Id.
Jd.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
See Brown, supra note 117, at 954-55.
Jd. at 955.
Id. at 947.
Id.
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corporate counsel. 145 However, as a result of the government
requesting waivers of the corporate attorney-client privilege,
employees believe their communications are protected as they fall
under the subject matter test, but in reality, they are not receiving the
protection the Supreme Court had hoped for under Upjohn. As such,
the Supreme Court may again need to consider revising the test
protecting communications under the corporate attorney-client
privilege.
Regardless of if or when the federal courts make a change, the
Maryland courts should consider the implications of these waivers
and consider limiting the privilege to the control group, as only those
who have the ability to waive the privilege should be protected by the
privilege during a suit in a Maryland court.
C.

The Control Group Test: One Proposed Solution to Government
Requested Waivers

There is at least one scholar who has indicated that the attorneyclient privilege needs to be reworked as a result of government
waivers. 146 Professor Lonnie T. Brown, Jr. indicated in his article
that: "[R]eform efforts should be directed towards defining the
corporate attorney-client privilege in a manner that preserves the
protection in its most fundamental form, and encouraging the
pertinent government agencies to commit formally to seeking waiver
of such a privilege only in very limited circumstances.,,147 As such,
Brown recommends the control group as a way of combating the
issues resulting from waivers being requested by prosecutors. 148
First, Brown defines who members of the control group shall
include:
A constituent of the organization who supervises, directs or
regularly consults with the organization's lawyer concerning
the matter or has authority to obligate the organization with
respect to the matter or whose act or omission in connection
with the matter may be imputed to the organization for
purposes of civil or criminal liability. 149
As such, only communications between those individuals falling into
the above description and corporate counsel "regarding the subject of
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
See Brown, supra note 117, at 952-53.
Id. at 952.
Seeid.
Id. at 953 (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 7 (2004».
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the representation should be protected by the corporate attorneyclient privilege.,,150 The communications "with those employees who
exercise managerial responsibility in the matter, who are alleged to
have committed the wrongful acts [that are] at issue ... or who have
authority on behalf of the corporation to make decisions about the
course of the [representation]" would be protected under the control
group test. lSI
Many corporate employees likely believe that their
communications with corporate counsel will be protected under the
corporate attorney-client privilege as they fall within the protections
afforded by the subject matter test,152 not knowing that the privilege
can be waived by those employees who fall within the control
group. 153 As such, protection under the attorney-client privilege
should likely be limited to those who have the ability to waive the
privilege, i.e. those belonging to the control group; and therefore, as a
result of the government requesting waivers of the attorney-client
privilege, the resurrection of the control group test may be imminent.
VII. ARGUMENTS FOR DENYING THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE TO CORPORATIONS ALTOGETHER
Although it is now clear that the attorney-client privilege applies to
corporations, prior to Upjohn, there were some scholars and even
courts which argued that the privilege should not apply to
corporations at all, limiting it solely to individuals. 154 As such, this
argument must also be considered for a comprehensive analysis of
the corporate attorney-client privilege. For example, in Radiant
Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Association,155 the United States
District Court, Northern District of Illinois stated that as there are
thousands of persons with access to corporate information, the
attorney-client privilege cannot reasonably be expanded to
corporations. 156
Additionally, it has been argued that the expansion of the attorneyclient privilege to corporate clients is too complex and confusing, and

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id.
Id. at 953 (alterations in original) (quoting Messing, Rudavsky & Weliky, P.e. v.
President & Fellows of Harvard CoIl., 764 N.E.2d 825, 833 (Mass. 2002».
See id. at 955.
See id.
Id. at 924.
207 F.Supp. 771 (N.D. III. 1962).
Id. at 775.
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therefore, it should not be adhered to in the corporate context. 157
Drawing a line between legal advice and business advice is often
difficult to do, and as only le~al advice falls within the privilege, the
privilege is difficult to apply. 8
Another consideration in the applicability of the attorney-client
privilege in the corporate context is the difficulty of knowing in
advance where an issue may be litigated. 159
As corporate
transactions often occur across multiple venues, and as different
federal and state courts apply different tests, the law to be applied,
and ultimately which test will be applied, can be difficult if not
impossible to predict. 16o
Other reasons for abandoning the attorney-client privilege in
corporations have also been noted. First, employees and officials
often believe that the privilege is designed to protect them as
individuals; 161 however, this is dangerous as in reality it is only an
"illusion.,,162 A corporation will likely protect itself ahead of an
employee, thereby waiving the attorney-client privilege, which could
in turn incriminate the employee. 163 The privilege also comes from
the right to individual autonomy, however, corporations are not
persons and are not protected by the same rights; therefore, the
argument has been made that the privilege should not be expanded to
protect corporations. 164
While questioning the continuation of the application of the
attorney-client privilege to corporations has been discussed and
analyzed, "[t]he legal community has overwhelmingly answered the
question of whether the privilege should be recognized in the
corporate context with a resounding 'yes. ",165 Even in the Supreme
Court's Upjohn decision, the imgortance of the corporate attomeyclient privilege was discussed. I
The Supreme Court noted that
"[t]he privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or advocacy serves
public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends upon the

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

See generally Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy: The Mythology of the
Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 157 (1993).
Id. at 167.
Id. at 170.
Id. at 170-71.
See id. at 173-74.
Id. at 174.
SeeidatI73-74.
Id. at 183-85.
Brown, supra note 117, at 924.
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389-90 (1981).
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lawyer's being fully infonned by the client.,,167 Additionally, the
Court acknowledged:
[C]omplications in the application of the privilege arise
when the client is a corporation, which in theory is an
artificial creature of the law, and not an individual; but [the]
Court . . . assumed that the privilege applie[ d] when the
client is a corporation .... 168
Instead of contemplating the denial of applying the privilege in the
corporate context, the bigger "concern has been with regard to the
proper scope and characteristics" of the privilege. 169 As a result, the
corporate attorney-client privilege is likely to continue in the future.
VIILCURRENT STATUS OF THE CORPORATE ATTORNEYCLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE STATE OF MARYLAND

In addition to the adoption of various versions of the subject matter
test by various states, the control group test by others, and the
demand of waivers of the privilege by government agencies, there is
additional history regarding the attorney-client privilege within
Maryland that must be considered for Maryland courts to best decide
which test should be applied.
A.

A Brief Overview of the Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied by
the Maryland Courts

A discussion of the rationale for the different attorney-client
privilege tests may be of significant importance in Maryland in the
future. However, before the Maryland courts are to choose a test, the
courts must consider how the attorney-client privilege has been
applied in Maryland %' to today. In E.l. du Pont de Nemours & Co.
v. Forma-Pack, Inc., 1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland noted "we
decline to adopt a particular set of criteria for the application of the
privilege in the corporate context until we are required to do SO.,,171
As such, the rules set out by the courts above are all possible
outcomes if, or more likely when, the Maryland courts are forced to
choose between the tests and establish a clear test to detennine what
communications are covered under the corporate attorney-client
privilege.
167.
168.

Id. at 389.
Id. at 389-90; see a/so United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S.

169.
170.

318,336 (1915).
Brown, supra note 117, at 924-25.
391 Md. 396, 718 A.2d 1129 (1998).
Id. at 421,718 A.2d at 1141.

171.
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Maryland's current statute on attorney-client privilege is very
broad, generic in scope, and reads as follows: "A person may not be
compelled to testify in violation of the attorney-client privilege.,,172
Outside of this statute, all other attorney-client privilege guidance has
been developed through case law. The Court of Appeals of Maryland
developed the following definition of the attorney-client privilege in
Harrison v. State: 173
(1) Where legal advice of kind is sought (2) from a
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the
communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by
the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived. 174

In E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., the Court of Appeals of
Maryland compared the attorney-client privilege to the work-product
doctrine, noting that the attorney-client privilege is to be narrowly
construed while the work-product doctrine is to be broadly
construed. 175 The court indicated that the rationale behind narrowly
construing the privilege is because its application ma~ have the effect
of withholding information from the finder of fact.I 6 Additionally,
"[ c]ommunications [with in-house counsel] with regard to business
advice are unprotected. When the attorney-client privilege is invoked
with regard to communications with in-house counsel, the courts will
look particularly closely at whether counsel was providing business
advice, rather than legal advice or services.,,177
Accordingly, in E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., the
communications were examined according to the above outlined
rules. 178 In this case, Dupont argued that its communications with
Kaplan & Kaplan (Kaplan) in regard to debt collection efforts were
covered under the attorney-client privilege as Kaplan was serving as
172.
173.
174.

175.
176.
177.
178.

MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-108 (LexisNexis 2006).
276 Md. 122,345 A.2d 830 (1975).
ld. at 135, 345 A.2d at 838 (quoting 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE
ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW INCLUDING THE
STATUTES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF ALL JURISDICTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND
CANADA § 2292 (3d ed. 1940)).
E.l. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 Md. at 406,718 A.2d at 1134 (citing Leonen v.
Johns-Manville, 135 F.R.D. 94, 96 (D.N.J. 1990)).
ld. at 415, 718 A.2d at 1138.
ld. at 422, 718 A.2d at 1142 (alterations in original) (quoting 5 LYNN McLAIN,
MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 503.9, at 493 (1987)).
ld.
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an agent of the Dupont legal department. 179 However, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland held that Dupont hired Kaplan to act in a
"business capacity" as opposed to a "legal capacity," and therefore,
the attorney-client privilege was not applicable. 180 As such, the Court
of Appeals of Maryland declined to adopt a test (either the control
group or the subject matter test) as the communications being
considered in this case were not protected under the privilege as they
were made in merely a business capacity. 181 Since this decision,
there have been no other Maryland decisions discussing the
application of the various corporate attorney-client privilege tests.
B.

A Discussion of the Policy Goals ofD~scovery and the AttorneyClient Privilege in Maryland

In an effort to determine which test, the subject matter or the
control group, should be applied by the Maryland courts, Maryland's
policy goals of discovery and the attorney-client privilege should be
examined. The Court of Appeals of Maryland also discussed the
goals of Maryland's discovery rules in E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co. 182 According to the court, Maryland's discovery rules "are
premised on a philosophy encouraging liberal disclosure.,,183 The
court also noted that the "discovery rules are deliberately designed to
be broad, comprehensive in scope and liberally construed.,,184
The Court of Appeals of Maryland stated the following in Klein v.
Weiss: 185
One of the fundamental and principal objectives of the
discovery rules is to require disclosure of facts by a party
litigant to all of his adversaries, and thereby to eliminate, as
far as possible, the necessity of any party to litigation going
to trial in a confused or muddled state of mind, concerning
the facts that give rise to the litigation. 186
Additionally, in another case, the same court also indicated the
following purposes in allowing for pretrial discovery: "(i) [T]o
acquire accurate and useful information with respect to testimony
179.

ISO.
lSI.
IS2.
IS3.
IS4.
IS5.
IS6.

1d. at 403-04, 71S A.2d at 1132-33.
Jd. at 422, 71S A.2d at 1142.
Jd. at 421-22, 71S A.2d at 1141-42.
See id. at 405-06, 71S A.2d at 1133-34.
Jd. at 405, 71S A.2d at 1133; see also Bait. Transit v. Mezzanotti, 227 Md. S, 13, 174
A.2d 76S, 771 (1961).
£,1. du Pont de Nemours, 351 Md. at 405, 71S A.2d at 1133.
2S4 Md. 36, 395 A.2d 126 (I 97S).
Jd. at 55, 395 at 137; see also Bait. Transit, 227 Md. at 13, 174 A.2d at 771.

2008

Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege

521

which is likely to be presented by an opponent, (ii) to obtain
information which appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence, and }iii) to use as an aid in crossexamining the opponent's witnesses.,,18
The Maryland courts have also held that a party resisting a
discovery request by asserting a privilege, such as the attorney-client
privilege, "bears the burden of establishing its existence and
applicability.,,188 Additionally, the Maryland courts have noted that
the attorney-client privilege is to be narrowly construed. 189
Although the Maryland courts have specifically declined to choose
a test, the policies outlined in Maryland case law may serve as clues
that indicate what choice the Maryland courts would make if faced
with such a decision in the future. Maryland's policy goals of the
attorney-client privilege combined with the decisions in other states
and the current concerns of forced waivers of the privilege may
provide the necessary clues in predicting how the Maryland courts
will apply the attorney-client privilege in the future.
IX. THE FUTURE OF THE ATTORNEY -CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN
MARYLAND-IS THE CONTROL GROUP TEST ONCE
AGAIN DESTINED TO BECOME THE TEST OF THE
FUTURE?
As discussed above, the Maryland courts have numerous choices
and much scholarly material to comb through once they are forced to
decide how to go forth in applying the attorney-client privilege to
corporations. The courts will need to decide if they will choose to
follow the subject matter test that has been recommended and applied
by the Supreme Court since the Upjohn decision,190 another version
of the subject matter test that has been followed bi a federal court or
a various state court/ 91 or the control group test. 19
First, Maryland's discovery goals as well as its policies in relation
to the attorney-client privilege must be compared to the goals of the
varying tests. Maryland promotes liberal discovery and designs rules

187.
188.

189.
190.
191.
192.

Kelch v. Mass Transit Admin., 287 Md. 223, 231, 411 A.2d 449, 454 (1980).
E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 351 Md. at 406,718 A.2d at 1134; see also Maxima Corp.
v. 6933 Arlington Dev. Ltd. P'ship, 100 Md. App. 441, 456, 641 A.2d 977, 984
(1994); In re Criminal Investigation No. 1I242Q, 326 Md. 1, 11, 602 A.2d 1220,
1225 (1992).
E.I. du Pont de Nemours, 351 Md. at 406,718 A.2d at 1134.
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.s. 383 (1981); see discussion supra Part Ill.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part Ill.
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to promote broad discovery.193 Additionally, Maryland courts have
indicated that the attorney-client privilege should be narrowly
construed. '94 Therefore, Maryland courts are likely to choose a test
that allows discovery to be broad and keeps the attorney-client
privilege narrow.
Based on these Maryland discovery policy goals, the Maryland
courts will likely follow in the footsteps of the Illinois Supreme
Court, which chose to follow the control group test, even postUpjohn,195 as this test was chosen to further promote Illinois' goals of
broad discovery.l96 The control group test is narrow in scope and
offers the benefits of broad discovery and predictability of
application,197 while the subject matter test provides broader
protection of attorney-client communications while further promoting
these communications as they are protected. 198
Although Maryland's discovery goals likely lead to the application
of the control group test, today's corporate environment and the
demanding of waivers of the attorney-client privilege even further
promote the control group test. One concern with the granting of
waivers of the attorney-client privilege to government prosecutors is
that this is leading to a lack of accountability amongst senior
management of large corporations. 199 As a result, lower level
employees are being sacrificed and turned over to prosecutors while
upper level management is not held accountable for their role or lack
thereof in the matter. 200 A similar concern was voiced with regard to
the subject matter test in the original Upjohn decision by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit when it applied the control
group test in favor of the subject matter test, in that the subject matter
test causes senior management to ignore information gained in an
attempt to place the employee in a situation where they must
communicate with corporate counse1. 201 As such, the subject matter
test, in combination with the government attorney-client privilege
waivers, seems to provide unprecedented protection to senior
management while leaving lower level employees out in the cold

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
20l.

See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 35, 89 and accompanying text.
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
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when they believe their communications with counsel are protected,
only for "control group" members to later waive the privilege.
In an attempt to counter these government re~uested waivers, bar
associations of numerous states are fighting back. 02 Maryland is one
state included in a group of states, along with Arkansas, Florida,
Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, and New York, pushing for the
revocation of these waiver requests,203 To prevent the requests of
these waivers, states are doing such things as changing their Rules of
Professional Conduct "to prohibit government attorneys practicing
[in the state] from requesting that companies waive their attorneyclient privilege to prove they are cooperating with the Jaovernment
probe" in an effort to protect the attorney-client privilege. 4
The problem with the attorney-client privilege and the information
obtained through internal corporate investigations is that employees
"may have no idea that they are providing information likely to go to
federal prosecutors, or that they may be forfeiting the Fifth
Amendment's protection against self-incrimination by providing
information to counsel conducting the interviews" as the privilege
can be waived by the corporation as it belon?s to the corporation,
which is the client, and not to the employee. 2o As such, employees
are more likely to provide information to their employer or a
corporation's attorney due to "an employee's sense of duty or loyalty
to her employer, her relationship to attorneys she either knows or
knows to be representing her employer, or the absence of
admonitions so commonly associated with questioning that may lead
to arrest or other law enforcement consequences," so they often
provide the requested information freely with little questioning. 206
After obtaining such information, a corporation may choose to waive
the attorney-client privilege, providing prosecutors with "all kinds of
information-including potentially incriminating statements-from
people who might otherwise decline to speak with prosecutors, FBI
agents, or other government investigator~."207 As such, "[t]here is no
reason to believe that employees at any level understand without
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explanation that lawyers working for their emplo~er ... may readily
metamorphose into de facto government agents.,,2 8
Counsel is only required to inform employees of who in fact is the
client during an internal investigation "when it is apparent that the
organization's interests are adverse to those of the [employee].,,209
Additionally, it is often difficult for counsel to know if the
employees' interests are adverse to the corporation's until after the
investigation and communication has begun; therefore, counsel will
not likely reveal to employees that the6' are not the client until after
incriminating information is revealed. 21
Another potential issue is that even if an attorney tries to
communicate to an employee that he is not the client, employees
"may be anxious to appear knowledgeable, or erroneously believe
that they understand counsel's role" and "[on] the basis of past
experience they may believe that counsel will seek to protect both the
individual and the corporation.,,211 As such, some now believe that
counsel should be required to provide employees with pre-interview
statements to ensure that they understand the attorney's role, similar
to "Miranda warnings in the law enforcement context.,,212
As employees often believe that a corporate attorney represents
them as an individual, they, therefore, are of the belief that their
communications to the attorney are protected under the attorneyclient privilege. One way· to prevent this belief would be to scale
back the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context and again
follow the control group test. Under this test, only those employees
who have the authority to obligate the corporation, act in a
supervis0g' capacity, or regularly consult with legal counsel are
protected. 13 As such, everyday, average employees would not be of
the belief that their communications with counsel are protected under
the attorney-client privilege. Ultimately, application of the control
group test, coupled with a pre-interview statement indicating that the
employees' statements are not protected under the privilege would
best protect employees and their rights against self-incrimination.
The control group test also better allows the corporate attornezYclient privilege to resemble the individual attorney-client privilege. 14
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Historically there has been some concern that the corporate attorneyclient Rrivilege expands the rights afforded to individuals as
clients. 15 Some have noted concern that the subject matter test
protects corporate employees who are not involved with the
underlying cause of action but serve merely as fact witnesses. 216 As
facts surrounding litigation are not covered under the individual
client privilege, it is desirable to choose a test that limits the
protection of facts surrounding litigation, precisely what the subject
matter test threatens to protect. 217 As such, adopting a control group
test that is expanded to include emRloyees whose actions may be
imputed on the corporation in a suir will best protect the corporate
attorney-client privilege from being expanded above and beyond the
individual attorney-client privilege while preventing protection of
communications between counsel and mere fact witnesses that limit
discovery.
One last consideration that should point courts, not only in
Maryland but also in federal and other state courts, towards once
again adopting the control group test is the issue of crossjurisdictional practice and a corporation's multi-jurisdictional
presence. As corporations cross state borders, and as one lawsuit can
lead to another, the issue of multiple tests in regard to the attorneyclient privilege in the corporate environment becomes even more
difficult. 219 Today, some states continue to apply the control group
test, while others follow the U.S. Supreme Court's lead in Upjohn in
applying the subject matter test. As such, there is a "lack of
uniformity between the states in this regard [that] poses a major
problem for national corporations with presences in various
jurisdictions. ,,220 There is even concern in the federal courts as to
which rule applies. As the "federal courts must apply state privilege
rules in a diversity case based on state law, the corporate attornex
may not know which test will be applied to the communication.,,2 I
Therefore, for corporations to ensure that the communications will be
protected in each and every venue where a case could arise, they
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should follow the narrowest test, the control group test. 222 The
Upjohn Court indicated the need to ensure the predictability of
whether or not a communication will be protected when it chose the
subject matter test;223 however, application of the narrowest test helps
to ensure predictability of what communications will be protected, as
attorney can only ultimately ensure communications will be protected
if they follow the more narrow control group approach. As a result,
if Maryland follows this recommendation and applies the control
group test, the courts will be protecting not only attorneys, but
corporate employees and their beliefs as to which communications
are protected by applying a more narrow test which the corporation
may alternatively face in another jurisdiction.

x.

CONCLUSION

Although the United States Supreme Court held that the subject
matter test should be used for analyzing the attorney-client privileBe
when it involves corporations, a bright-line rule was not provided. 4
As such, federal courts are left to interpret the ruling as they see fit.
Additionally, the Supreme Court's ruling is not binding on individual
states; therefore, a variety of rules in this area of law have been
established, including continued adherence to the control group test
that was rejected in Upjohn and the adoption of various forms of the
subject matter beyond the test adopted by the Upjohn Court. As
Maryland courts have yet to decide which rule to apply, any of the
above options could be applied and adopted by the Maryland courts
in the future.
However, the control group test seems to provide the most
protection of corporate employees, while promoting Maryland's
policy goals surrounding pre-trial discovery. After the corporate
scandals of recent years, the SEC and other government agencies are
requiring that corporations waive the attorney-client privilege in
order for the corporation to receive favorable treatment during an
investigation. 225 As a result, employees may be under a false sense of
protection under the subject matter test while providing information
to legal counsel, whom employees often believe will protect them as
they are their co-workers and friends, during corporate
investigations. 226 As such, the control group test is more likely to
222.
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protect employees as their communications would normally not be
covered under this test to begin with; therefore, employees will be
more inclined to protect themselves against self-incrimination during
corporate investigations. The Maryland courts should adopt the
control group test as federal law related to the attorney-client
privilege is flawed-government agencies are requesting too many
waivers of the privilege, the subject matter test provides too much
protection of senior management, and the subject matter test too
strictly restrains discovery in violation of Maryland's policy goals.
Jami M Watt

